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MALE WAGE RATES AND MARITAL STATUS
Lawrence W. Kenny
Abstract
Numerous studies have found that married men earn consider-
ably more than single men of the same education, experience, etc.
There are several possible explanations of this phenomenon. Recent
theoretical developments in the economics of marriage predict that males
with higher wage rates have a greater gain from marriage and are
therefore more likely to marry. Alternatively, one of the benefits of
marriage is specialization in the labor force; married men spend more
hours in the labor force than single males and thus have a greater
incentive to invest in human capital.
The empirical work in this paper suggests that a large
fraction of the unexplained wage differential between married males and




Gainesville, Florida 32611I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have found that married men earn considerably more
than single men o the same education, experience, etc. There are several
possible explanations of this phenomenon. Recent theoretical developments
in the economics of marriage predict that males with higher wage rates
have a greater gain from marriage and are therefore more likely to marry.
Alternatively, one of the benefits of marriage is specialization in the
labor force; married males spend more hours in the labor force than single
males and thus have a greater incentive to invest in human capital.
This paper attempts to ascertain the relative importance of the
selectivity and investment explanations which have been outlined above.
The empirical work accordingly focuses on the determination of wage rates
and on the determination of the number of hours worked.
II. THEORY
Let us briefly reconstruct the marriage model which was developed by
Becker (1973) and Keeley (1974). It is assumed that both married and
single persons produce some aggregate commodity Z. The total gain from
marriage (C) is the difference between married real income and single real
income,
G=z—z —z, mf m f
where
2 total real income of m and f when married,
mf
Z —realincome of the male (in) when single,
Zf —realincome of the female (f) when single.2
Zf
is maximized subject to the production function
Stm in
Z=f(t,t,X) mf in f
and subject to,thefull income budget constraint
Wm+wm+pXm=(w +W)T+V+ mm ff int m f
where
time devoted to household production by married male,
timedevotedto household production by married female,
=marketgoods and services bought by married couple,
W=wagerate of male (or shadow 'age if notworking),
Wf =wagerate of female (or shadow wage ifnotworking),
P=priceof market goods and services,
T =totaltime available,




Similarly, Z is maximized subject to the production function
Z =g(t5,X5)
and subjectto the full income budget constraint
Wt + PXS =WT +V mm m m in
andZf is maximized subject to the production function
Z =h(tS,X5)
and subject to the budget constraint
Wft + PXT + Vf.
where
)3
t8 —timedevoted to household production by single male,
t time devoted to household production by single female,
X market goods and services bought by single male,
=marketgoods and services bought by single female.
Iff, g, and h have constant returns to scale, commodity output maybe
expressed as





m C (W ,P) mm
WfT + Vf
z=ICW
whereCf C, and Cf are the cost—minimizing average costsof production.
How are the gains from marriage related to the male wage rate? It
can be shown that
m s m m ——
3W C C m mf m
where
=T—= timespent in market work by a male of marital status
1 C T—(WT+WT+V +V)mf cT—(wT+v-—
mf m f m f3Wm-m tn in
3W 2
in Cmf in
Twoofthe first order conditions for cost minimization are
3C 3C
____ and = Substitutingthese into the above equation,
m mf in in
T_tinT_tS m in — = —.. —
3W C C
in mf m4
Ifa man has a higher wage than hiswife and if the two have equal home
productivitieS whenm = thenthe married male will speciaiizeinthe
labor force (i.e., > Q) arid will work more thanhewould if he were
single. Therefore, sLnce > and C< C ,aniucteascin the male
m m nit ni
wage rate increases the gainsfrom ir.arriage. Basically, the benefitsof
specializationassociated with the husbandspending more hours in the
labor market (m > orassociated with the wife assuming a greater
sharein household production (C < C )increaseas the male wage rises.
The theory of marriage (Becker 1973) predictsthat male wages will be
negatively correlated with female wages;that is, ceteris high
wage males will marry low wagefemales, and low wage males will marry high
wage females. Low wage malesthen specialize in household production,and
an increase in their wages willdecrease their gains from marriage. The
incidence of male specialization in household production
appears to be
quite low. Thus, there will be a predominatelYpositive association
between male wages and the gain from marriage;and married males will have
higher wages than single males partlybecause those males with high wages
have found it worthwhile to marry. The positiverelation between marriage
and the male wage rate therefore in part reflects aselectivity phenomenon.
As we have seen, married males will tend towork more hours, other
things equal, than single males. Themarginal revenue of an incremental
unit of human capital investment increases asthe number of hours spent
working rises.2 Married males accordinglyhave a greater incentive to
invest in human capital, and marriage—associated
investment will create
part of the observed wagedifferential between married arid singlemales.
2See, for example, Polachek (1.975)5
A symmetrical argument relates female wages to marital status. Single
females have higher wages than married females partly because single
females spend more hours in the labor market than married females and also
partly because high wage females have not found it worthwhile to marry.
It is surprising to note that in the literature on the determination of
female wages there are few, if any, references to marital selectivity.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we will try to ascertain what
part of the male wage differential may be ascribed to selectivity and what
part may be attributed to marriage—associated investment. The fact that
some marriage—associated investment may occur prior to marriage and between
marriages makes this a difficult, if not impossible, task. For, as the
number of hours spent working over the life cycle increases (e.g., the
benefits of specialization in marriage increase), the marginal revenue of
investment in human capital increases in each period, whether the individ-
ual is married or single, leading to an increase in investment in human
capital in each period.
For seyeral reasons, married males face a lower marginal cost of
investment in human capital than otherwise identical single males. A man
is able to borrow at lower cost from a wife than from other sources to
finance investment in human capital; this is partly because alimony reduces
the risk faced by wives when they finance their husbands' investment in
human capital. It is reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of hourly
investment in human capital is an increasing function of the quantity of
investment per hour. A given level of annual investment in training will
then be cheaper to individuals when they are working many hours (e.g.,
married) than when they are working few hours (e.g., unmarried). Thus,
although there is likely to be more annual investment in human capital when6
anindividual is married, the difference between an individual's annual
rate of investment in human capital while married and an individual's
annual rate of investment in human capital while singlo, other things
equal, provides only a lcwer bound on thequantityof marriageassociated
investment.
Letus now more formally specify the relation betweenwage rates and
maritalstatus. The wage rate of individual i in year i
(W1)may be
written as




fraction of total available hours (T) whichwasspent working
inyeart,
resourcesper hour at work devoted to acquiring job skills and
information,
r =average"rate of return" to investment in human capital,
=adjustmentto wage rate in year j to compensate worker for
- distastefuljob conditions or for living in an expensive or
less desirable area,
=stochasticdisturbance in year j.
This specification allows individuals working 2000 hours per year to
receive twice the total return to their investment as individuals who work
1000 hoursperyear and whoinvestat thesame hour].y rate.
The resources per hour which are devoted to the acquisition of human
capital may be rewritten as7
I—t +6(M) +a (2) t,i t,s t t,n,m I
where
't,s
resources per hour at work devoted to acquiring job skills
and information by single males in year t,
M ."additional"resources per hour at work devoted by married
t ,n,m




1 if married in year t; 0 if not married in year t,
=individual—specificcomponent of hourly Investment which is
unrelated to marital status.
Similarly annual investment mayberewritten as
=
+ 6tX)t,n,m +Act. (3)
where
=annualinvestment by single males In year t,
(AI)tnm ="additional"annual Investment by married males in year
t and in their th year of marriage.
The terms and pick up differences across individuals in their
propensity to invest in human capital as well as some of the differences
in investment due to marriage—associated investment. The rest of marriage—
associated investment, that part due to the lower cost of investment during
marriage, is captured by the terms (M) and (AAI)tnm Married males
are predicted to invest more resources annually in human capital accumula-
tion than single males (i.e., (AI) >0)because wives help to finance
t ,n,m
this investment and because a given annual rate of investment is cheaper8
when spread over many hours. The latter argument predicts that the hourly
rate of investment will be less for married males than for single males
(i.e., (td)tnm < 0). The increase in annual investrnei-it b'ought about by
the wife's financing of her husband's human capital accumulation may,
however, cause (tI) to be positive.
t ,nii
As men move through their life cycle, the marginal revenue of invest-
ment in human capital falls and assets accumulate. Moreover, as assets
accumulate, the benefits of financing investment in human capital wit;hin
the marriage decrease. It therefore follows that
(ixI)
t,_!iz.! < t,n.i < o
at an
a(AI)
t,n,m < t,n,m <
at an
Combiningequations (1), (2), and (3),
i—i i—i j—l
W. =W .+ r(AI) + r6 (LXI) + a,r X
J,iS1 tO t,s 0 t,n,m 1t=0
—I. —6.(I) —a+ D. + E. (4)
j j,n,m I j j
Equation (4) will be estimated in section LII.
The growth in the wage rate in the k years following year jequals
W j+k I =Wj+kjWjj
j+k-l j+k-l j+k-l




—((tNT). —ó.(I). ) j+k,s j,s j+k )+K,n,m j
+ (Dj+k —D)
+ (E.+k —E,) (5)
)9
The growth in the wage rate over time therefore is positively related to
the growth in previous investment over this period, is negatively related
to the fall in current investment, and is positively related to the change
in wage compensation (D.+k —D).Inparticular, if (tI) is negative,
j t,n,m
then wage growth is predicted to be negatively related to initial marital
status (6) and positively related to final marital status In the
empirical work that follows this section, equation (5) will also be esti-
mated.
We will now compare people to themselves. We will compare the growth
in wage rates in adjacent married years to the growth in wage rates in
adjacent unmarried years. Suppose that a person is married in years j+k
and j+k+l and is unmarried in years j and j+l. Equation (4) implies that
the annual growth in wage rates in married years less the annual growth in
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—A,)+ (Dj+k+l - — +D) + (7)
The term in brackets is predicted to be positive since (AI)tnm is expected
to fall over t.he life cycle. This specification has the advantage that the
bias brought about by the presence of term individual—specific terms appears
to be negligible, for the term r(X+k —A.)equals zero if labor supply
in period j+k equals labor supply in period j. Moreover, the assumption,
found in equations (2) and (3), that annual individual—specific investment
in human capital varies with current labor supply, may be questioned. The
predictions of equation (7) will be tested in section III.
It has been argued that marriage leads, through an increase in hours
worked, to higher wages. Knowledge of the relation between the number of
hours worked and wages, together with information about the effect of
marriage on labor supply, will enable us to ascertain what part of the
observed wage differential between married and never—married males is
attributable to differential labor supply. First, some additional struc-
ture must be given to the investment profile.
If is defined to equal the ratio of hourly investment costs (Is.)
to the gross wage (Wj +I)
and if Am is assumed to be small, then
equation (1) can be rewritten to yield
i—i





d —amenityor cost of living adjustment.11
Furthermore, assume that
—t.3 (9)
CombinIng (8) and (9),




2n Wj+k —2nW11 r A
—r8Att + 8k
+ (d.+k —d.)+ (vj+k —v.) (11)
The predictions found in equation (11) will be put to a testin section
III. Let us then turn to the empirical work.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The primary data set used in this preliminary investigation isthe
seven year Panel Study of Income Dynamics.Variables are defined in the
appendix at the end of the paper. The sample consistsof males who were
in the sample for the entire seven year period (1968—1974),who had earn-
ings in 1973, and whose estimated wage rateexceeded $0.50. Unless other-
wise specified, all empirical work will refer to this data set.
The Project TALENT data set has been used to supplementthe results
obtained from the Income Dynamics data set. Project TALENT is astrati-
fied, random sample of all students in grades nine through12 in 1960. I
3me specification in equation (9) assumes that the rate of invest-
ment per hour is unrelated to the number of annualhours spent working.
In future work1 this assumption will be relaxed.12
have selected a subsample of the twelfth grade males; observations where
information was missing were deleted. There were follow—up surveys in
1961, 1965, and 1971; the response rate to the 1965 and 1971 surveys was
in the vicinity of 30 percent. It will soon be seen thattheintermittence
of the folloc—up surveys severely limits the usefulne-s of this data s't
for probing the relation between wages and marital status. Again, all
variable definitions are given in the appendix.
A. Labor Supply
It has been predicted that married men will work more hours than
unmarried men. If married males work many more hours than single male3,
then married males have a much greater incentive to invest in human capital,
and marriage—associated investment in human capital is likely to be an
important component of the difference between the wage rate ofmarried
males and the wage rate of single males. With this in mind, let us turn
to the regressions in Tables 1 and 2, which explain variatioa in the total
number of hours worked in 1973 among those aged 64 dr less.
Most of the variables have a significant impact on labor supply. A
10 percent increase in the wage rate leads to a 34 hour reduction in the
number of hours worked per year. The number of years of schooling (Eli) is
significantly positive oniy when the log of the wage rate (LW4) is oneof
the regressors.4 The positive sign of age (ACEH4) and the negative sign
4It is puzzling to find that LW4 and EU take on opposite signs. If
art increase in education generates a neutral increase in household produc-
tivity, then labor supply will be unaltered. Under this neutrality assurnp—
don, educational attainment and wages both measure human capital. Borjas
(1978) offers an explanation of the then inconsistent signs. He shows
that the often observed negative relationship between the wage rate and
labor supply may he spuriously induced by estimating the wage rate as the
ratio of earnings to hours worked.13
TABLE 1
LABOR SUPPLY: HOURS
HOURH4 . HOURH4 . }IOURH4 . HOURH4
CONSTANT 1466254a 1312290a 1444883a 1289731a
(275.794) (265.962) (275.979) (266.107)
EH 7.483 29930a 7.461 29929a
(4.224) (4.482) (4.222) (4.480)
AGEH 35930a 51860a 35491a 51416a
(12.597) (12.207) (12.594) (12.202)
ACE2 —.515a —. 691a — —
(.140) (.136) (.140) (.136)
STU4 1784559a 1790499a 1775127a 1780617a
(280.933) (270.599) (280.864) (270.496)
EXPCU4 10074a 12840a 10059a 12827a
(2.054) (1.992) (2.053) (1.991)
1JN4 118260a —28.021 121317a —31.134
(32.518) (32.221) (32.557) (32.249)
RACE1 101801a 152493a 102492a 153269a
(34.712) (33.704) (34.699) (33.686)
SICK 122a 129a —122a 129a
(.017) (.016) (.017) (.016)
MARR4 224•967a 260255a 262786a 299935a





.123 .187 .124 .188
No. Obs's. 1828 1828 1828 182814
TABLE 2
LABOR SUPPLY: HOURS
HOURH4 . HOtJRH4 . HOUIU14 . HOUR}{4
CONSTANT 1461384a 1.388q6a 1431.766'
(279.245) (269.055) (279.685) (269.464)
EH 8.033 27481a 8.147 27•591a
(4.846) (4.939) (4.844) (4.937)
ACEH4 35953a 51194a 35921a 51•633a
(12.879) (12.469) (12.872) (12.462)
AGE2 —.516a —.686a —.519a —.689
(',145) (.140) (.145) (.140)
STU4 1782667a 1799762a 1779989a 17901ç3a
(281.233) (270.778) (281.159) (270.694)
PCU4 12797a 10075a 12775a
(2.057) (1.994) (2.056) (1.993)
UN4 118532a —25.286 121682a —28.376
(32.577) (32.315 (32.616) (32.349)
RACE1 102033a 152897a 101397a 152258a
(35.949) (34.871) (35.934) (34.854)
SICK —.122a —.128a —.122a —.128a
(.017) (.016) (.017) (.016)
MARRY4 241987a 173388a 288412a 719459a
(90.254) (87.085) (94.472) (91.136)
W1D4 237.038 235.171
(143.237) (137.904)
EW4 —1.455 7.344 —1.930 6.871
(6.157) (5.973) (6.161) (5.977)
CHIL4 —.418 3.032 —2.001 1.461
(9.272) (8.932) (9.317) (8.974)
LW4 34065a 340 61O
(28.390) (28.375)
R2 .123 .187 ,24 .189
No. Obs's. 1828 1828 1828 182815
of age squared (AGE2) imply that the life cycle profile of labor supply
resembles an inverted U; labor supply is estimated to peak around age 36.
Students (STU4=l) are estimated to work nearly 1800 fewer hours per year
than non-students. An additional year of seniority on a given job (EXPCU4)
is associated with approximately 11 more hours of work per year. When LW4
is not one of the regressors, union members OJN4) work significantly fewer
hours than non-union members. Nonwhites (RACE11) work between 101 and 153
fewer hours per year than whites, and individuals who were sick 10 hours
over the 1967—1973 period (SICK) are estimated to work one less hour in
1973.
Let us now examine the relationship between marital status and labor
supply. Variables measuring the wife's education and the 'presence of
children are found in Table 2 but not in Table 1. Consider first the
regressions in Table 1. As predicted, married males (MARR4=l) work signi-
ficantly more hours than unmarried males. Married males are estimated to
supply approximately 250 more hours per year to the labor force than
unmarried males; this estimate is quite close to Parson's (1977) estimate,
which was obtained from another sample. In the third and fourth regres-
sions, widowers are estimated to work nearly as many hours as married
males. However, the coefficient of W1D4 is estimated very imprecisely;
widowers do not work significantly more hours than the group of divorced,
separated, or never—married males. The MARR4 coefficient is again signi-
ficantly positive in Table 2.If education increases market productivity
more than household productivity, then men married to more educated women
will have smaller gains from marriage and will work fewer hours than men
married to less educated women. On the other hand, men married to highly
educated women may have more human capital and may therefore work more16
hours than men married to women with little education.5 Neither the edu-
cation of the wife (EW4) nor the number of children in the family unit
under 18 years of age (CHIL4) significantly affect the husband's labor
supply.
The marriage coefficient in Tables 1 and 2 may be biased. Married
males may work more hours than single ma1e because they have nore human
capital than single males rather than because of the specialization that
accompanies marriage.6 Some insight into the importance of this bias is
gained by explaining changes over the life cycle in the number of hours
worked.
The regressions in Tables 3 and 4 explain part of the variation
across individuals in the change in the number of annual hours worked
between 1967 and 1973 (HOUR84). Most of the variables are significant
only in the full sample and in the subsample of those who were married in
1968; variables which are significant in the subsample of those who were
not married in 1968 will be noted. The growth in hours between 1967 and
1973 falls with age; moreover, the coefficient of ACEH4 in Tables 3 and 4
is close to the coefficient that would have been predicted on the basis of
the regressions in Tables I and 2 (i.e., 12 times the coefficient of AGE?
in Tables 1 and 2). The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of change
in the number of hours sick (SICK84), change in the wage rate (W84), and
change in job tenure (EXPC84) are also consistent with Tables 1 and 2. In
every sample, the change in student status (STUS4) is significantly and
negatively related to the change in labor supply. Married students have a
much greater increase in labor supply when they leave schooi than do
5Note that this argument assumes a positively sloped labor supply
curve.
)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































unmarried students. Part of this difference may be attributed to the role
that wives play in the financing of their husband's investment in human
capital. The positive sign of change in union status (UN84) is puzzling,
for in the hours regressions, union members are estimated to work fewer
hours than individuals who do not belong to unions.
Only in one regression in Table 3 does change in marital status
(MARR84) have a significant impact on HOUR84. Males who get married
experience approximately 40 hours greater growth in hours worked than
males who remain single; this difference, however, is insignificant. If
the sample of those who were not married in 1968 is divided into two sub—
samples——those who in 1968 had never been married and those who in 1968
were divorced, widowed, or separated——then the MARR84 coefficients in
comparable but unreported regressions approximately equal 20 and 210 in
the two respective samples; in these small samples, neither coefficient is
significant. Those who marry for the first time appear to experience vir—
tually no increase in time spent working. The coefficients in the third
and fourth regressions in Table 3 imply that males who become separated or
divorced experience significantly less (180 hours) growth in hours worked
than males who remain married. Change in widower status (W1D84) is not
significantly related to the change in labor supply over the life cycle.
Whydoesmale labor supply change so little at first marriage when
the response to other changes in marital status is so great? There are
several possible explanations. A large expenditure is associated with
getting married; this goes to acquiring furniture, taking a honeymoon,
having a wedding reception, perhaps buying a house, etc. If capital
markets are imperfect, then one way to acquire the desired funds is to
increase labor supply prior to marriage. The observations that wedding-20
related expenditures tend to be smaller in subsequent marriages and that
males are older when they remarry and therefore have assets upon which to
borrow may help to explain the observed asymmetry in labor supply.
It could be argued that the coefficients in Table 3 result from the
tax on earnings associated with alimony and child support payments; how-
ever, this argument is inconsistent with the Large (although insignificant)
increase in labor supply with remarriage and is inconsistent with evidence
(from unreported regressions) that males who become separated decrease
their the spent in the labor market by nearly 160 more hours than males
who become divorced7
It could also be argued that differences in human capital rather than
specialization generate the differences in labor supply between married
males and single males which are found in Table 1. The change in hours
worked would then be unrelated to the change in marital status. This line
of reasoning would not explain the fall in labor supply that accompanies
divorce or separation.
Consider now the marriage and family structure variables in Table 4.
The change in the number of children under 18 in the household (DKID) and
the change in widower status have positive but insignificant coefficients.
MARR84 is significantly negative in the sample of males who were not mar—
ned in 1968 and is significantly positive in the sample of males who were
married in 1968. The change in the wife's education (EW84) is significant
and positive in the former sample and is significant and negative in the
latter sample. Because the wife's education takes on a value of 0 when
the male is not married, EW34 and MARRS4 are highly positively correlated;
the correlation coefficient equals 0.88 and 0.45 in the unmarried and
7The latter difference is not significant.21
married subsamples, respectively. The flip-flopping of coefficients across
samples may thus be caused by multicollinearity and may not reflect a
behavioral relationship. The pattern of coefficients would be difficult
to explain if multicollinearity were not a problem.
Additional evidence on the relation between marital status and labor
supply is found in Table 5. Since the regressions in this table are
similar to regressions which have already been discussed, let us turn
immediately to the marriage coefficients. In the subsample of those who
are not married in 1968, those who are married in 1974 work over 250 more
hours in 1967 than those who are not married in 1974. In the subsample of
those who are married in 1968, future marital status does not have a signi-
ficant impact on current labor supply. These results are consistent with
the imperfect capital markets argument which was put forward earlier in
this paper. Moreover, the regressions in Table 5 are not explained by the
tax on wages which is brought about by alimony payments. Why would single
males who anticipate getting married work additional hours?
The evidence which has been presented on the relation between labor
supply and marital status suggests the following scenario: prior to mar-
riage, single males increase the number of hours supplied to the market in
order to accumulate savings. Because of the specialization that accompa-
nies marriage, this high labor supply continues through the marriage. With
divorce or separation, there is less specialization in the labor market,
and male labor supply falls. An alternative scenario that appears to be
less supported by the data would explain the observed differences in labor




LABORSUPPLY: TIlE EFFECT OF FUTURE MARITAL STATUS
Not Married in 1968 Married in 1968
HOUtH8 HOLTRH8 HOURH8 HOURH8
CONSTANT 1224.847 882.651 1818665a
(1339. 669)(1128.090) (268. 158) (262. 185)
EH 1.495 17.327 10315a 37515a
(18.605) (19.432) (4.317) (4.645)
AGEH4 25.954 43.803 24866a 56486a
(49.254) (48.933) (11.406) (11.185)
AGE2 —.257 —.427 —. —. 550a
(.527) (.522) (.121) (.118)
sTu8 1134227a 1171721a 1701341a 1830031a
(234.224) (230.503) (132.132) (126.761)
EXPCU8 24089a 29263a 7008a —1.683
(12.026) (12.005) (2.259) (2.200)
UN8 —235.320 —163.133 —65.864 31.718
(168.922) (168.583) (33.881) (33.289)
RACE1 —92.161 —169.621 130535a 226669a
(160.443) (160.830) (35.814) (35.066)
SICK .025 —.002 112a
(.080) (.080) (.018) (.017)
MARR4 279864a 263592a —39.177 .234
(132.378) (130.151) (75.398) (72.170)
LW8 28866.,a _409678a
(120.831) (32.066)
.329 .358 .131 .206
No. Obs's. 136 136 1746 1746
)23
B. Wage Rates
Much of the work in 8ection II was devoted to showing how marital
history and marital status may affect wages. Let us first explain some of
the variation across individuals in the level of wage rates. The regres-
sions in Table 6 test the specification implied by equation (4). MARR4
measures current marital status (6 ),andMARRYR and SEC together measure
j
li—i
the number of years married prior to the current year I ó .Wedo not
t=O
know exactly how many years these respondents have been married prior to
1968. All that is known is the age of first marriage, how many years the
respondent has been separated, widowed, or divorced by 1968 if separated,
widowed, ordivorcedat the time of the survey in 1968 (a bracketed
answer), and whether or not the marriage in 1968 (if married in 1968) is
the respondent's first marriage. MARRYR incorporates the first two pieces
of information, and SEC, a dummy variable which equals one if the 1968
marriage is not the first marriage, incorporates the third pieceof infor-
mation. The error in the measurement of MARRYR is thus expected to
increase with age. In the full sample, the correlation between the number
of years married (MARRYR) and experience (EXP) is quite high. Because of
this high correlation, it is difficult to separate the impact of marriage
from the effect of experience. In younger samples, the correlation
between MARRYR and EXP is lower. Younger samples are used in Table 6 to
take advantage of the smaller correlation between MARRYR and EXP and to
take advantage of the reduced error in the measurement of MARRYR.
These regressions explain variation in the log of the wage rate (LW4).
The coefficients are both more plausible and more significant in the older
subsample, which has more than twice as many observations as the subsample





























































































































































































































































the subsample of males 29 or younger are marital status (MARR4) and dis-
tance from the nearest standard metropolitan statistical area (DIST4),
which takes on a negative sign. In the subsample of males aged 34 or
younger, educational attainment (LII), years of experience on the current
job (EXPCU4), union membership (UN4), MARRYR, and MARR4 have significant
positive signs and race (RACE1) and DIST4 have significant negative signs.
The number of years of full—time—equivalent job experience (EXP), experi-
ence squared (EXP2), SICK, SEC, size of the largest city in the sampling
unit (CITY4), state value of land and buildings per acre in agriculture
(ACND4), county population density (DENS4), the state's average yearly
rainfall (PREC4), the state's average January temperature (JAN4), the
state's average July temperature (JULY4), and JULY4 squared (JULY42) do
not significantly affect wage rates.
Since the significant results for the most part replicate the results
of earlier earnings functions studies, we will proceed to a discussion of
the coefficients of the three marriage variables. Those who are currently
married (MARR4=l) have significantly higher wages than those who are not
currently married. This may reflect either a positive correlation between
i—i
MARR4 and ar At —a,,the unobserved Individual—specific component of
t=0
investment which is independent of current marital status, or a lower rate
of hourly investment among married males than among single males (I.e.,
(I)jnm <0).8Controlling for years married results in only a 20 per
cent drop in the MARR4 coefficients. The number of years of previous
marriage experience (MARRYR) is correctly positive but Is significant only
when MARR4 is omitted from the regression in the sample of those 34 or
8
A positive correlation between NARRYRanda1rA1 -isalso
anticipated. t026
younger. Using the coefficients from the second and fifth regressions, it
is estimated to take between 1.4 and 5.3 years of 2revious marriage exper-
ience to generate the unexplained 98 cent wage differential between married
ma1c aud never—married males found in similar regressions using the fdi
sample.
There is also weak evidence supporting the expectation that the addi-
tional annual investment that occurs within marriage falls as the number
of years of marriage increases. In the sample of those 29 or younger
(where the mean value of MARRYR equals 5.99), one year of marriage
increases the wage rate by 2.6 percent, while in the sample of tho;e 34 or
younger (where the mean of MARRYR equals 8.02), one year of marriage
increases the wage rate by oniy 1.2 percent. However, regressions using
the natural logarithm of MARRYR instead of MARRYR were less successful in
explaining variation in LW4 than were the regressions reported in Table 6.
Similar regressions, estimated from the Project TALENT data, are
found in Table 7. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
wage rate in 1971 (WYEAR11). Years of schooling (EH) is significant and
positive. Recall that this sample comprises but one cohort; therefore,
one additional year of schooling is obtained at the expense oi one year of
on—the—job experience. The number of jobs held between 1965 and 1971
(JOBS), the fraction of the year spent sick in 1961 (SICK1), and race
(RACE) do not significantly affect wages. Those who grew up in rural—farm
or small town areas (RURAL) are more likely than others to be living in
1971 in these areas, where the cost of living is low. It can therefore be
plausIbly argued that the significant negative coefficient of RURAL captures
a compensating wage differential associated with differences in the cost of

























































































In this sample, a sizable part of the wage differential absociated
with marital sLatus appears to be attributable to differences in invest—
inent. Married males (MARR=l) are estimated to earn 14 percent more per
hour than unmarried males. Huwever, when variables measuring the number
of years married prior to ]971 enter the regression, this coefficient drops
by nearly 50 percent. MARR is significant in both regressions. Our knowl-
edge of the respondent's marital history is extremely limited; we know his
age at first marriage, his marital status in 1965, hismarital status in
1971, and the number of marriages in 1971. MARRYR measures the number of
(j—].•
yearsof previous marriage experience I; it equals 28 less the age at
t=O
first marriage and is constrained to be nonnegative. NOMARR1 is also used
to measure the number of years of marital experience. NOMARR1 equals the
nt.mher of marriages in excess of one. As predicted, MARRYR is significantly
positive and NOMARR1 is significantly negative. One year of previous mar-
riage experience increases the wage rate by 1.8 percent. Using thcoeffi-
cients from the second regression, it is estimated to take nearly four years
of previous marriage experience to produce the observed unexplained marital
wage differential. Being married twice is estimated to be equivalent to
losing five to six years of marriage experience; these estimates are quite
close to the actual median time between separation andremarriage.9
Finally, the fourth regression is estimated using a sample in which our
knowledge of marital experience is fairly precise: the sample of once
married, currently married individuals. This regression is quite similar
to the others. Finally, note that unreported regressions using the log of
MARRYR are less successful in explaining variations in WYEAR11 than the
regressions reported in Table 7.
9SeeBecker,Landes, and Michael (1977), p. 1172.29
Returning to the Income Dynamics data, regressions are presented in
Table 8 which attempt to explain differences across individuals in the
increase in wage rates between 1967 and 1973 (W84). The regressions are
based on equation (5) in section II. Wage growth is estimated as a func-
tion of educational attainment (EH), change in union membership (DUN84),
the number of hours sick between 1967 and 1973 (SICK), race (R.ACE1),
change in city size (DCITY84), change in average state January tempera—
tures (DJAN84), a dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual
changed states (DSTATE), experience (EXP), the number of years married
between 1968 and 1973 (MARRYR2), marital status in 1968 (MARR8), marital
status in 1974 (MARR4), and dummy variables measuring changes in marital
status over this period.
In order to hold marital status in 1968 ()constant,the sample has
been split into two groups: those who were not married in 1968 and those
who were married in 1968. Let us first examine the first three regres-
sions, which are based on the former subsample. Surprisingly, a move to a
warmer climate is associated with a significant increase in the wage rate;
DJAN84 is significantly positive)0 The cross sectional evidence, however,
shows that workers are willing to work for lower wages in warmer climates.
The positive coefficient of DJANB4 may be reflecting the migration of pre-
dominantly skilled workers to the sunbelt. Changing states (DSTATE) leads
to a significant increase In wages in the first regression. The marriage
variables support the predictions of equation (5). Those who marry between
1968 and 1974 (NNARR=1) are estimated to experience nearly a $1.00 greater
increase in the wage rate than those who do not marry in this period; the
101n unreported regressions, the significance of the positive coeffi-
cient of DJAN84 persists even after the distance of the move has been held
constant.ificant at .05 level
TABLE 8
WAGE GROWTH 1967 to 1973
Not Married in 1963
1I84 W24 W84 W84 'M14 WP4
















































































































































































average value of W84 is $2.00. The numberof years married between 1968
and 1973 (MARRYR2) also has a significant and positive impact on wage
growth. When final marital status (MARR4) is held constant, anadditional
year of marriage is estimated to increasethe wage rate by 43 cents. It
should be noted that the significant positive coefficients of NMARR and
MARRYR2 may result from a positive correlation between these variables and
a1. MARR4has a negative but insignificant coefficient; currently married
males experience a wage growth which is 63 cents less than the wage growth
of males who are not currently married. It therefore would take nearly
four years of .arevious marriage experience to build the unexplained98 cent
wage differential that is observed between marriedmales and never—married
males. None of the remaining variables are significant.
The only variable that is significantly associated with wage growth
in the subsample of those who were married in 1968 is educational attain-
ment. Wage growth between 1968 and 1974 increases by 13 centswith every
additional year of schooling. The marital variables often have a plausible,
although insignificant, impact on wagegrowth. Males who were not mar-
ried for at least one year in the 1969—1974 period (LOSS1) are estimated
to have a 29 cent smaller increase in their wage rate than maleswho were
married continuously in the period. When MARR4 is held constant, an addi-
tional year of marriage leads to a 17 cent larger increase in wage growth.
The MARRYR2 coefficient in regression (5) is approximately 40 percentof
the size of the MARRYR2 coefficient in regression (2). Since the mean
number of years married is 13 years greater in the latter sample, this
finding is consistent with the additional annual investnitntthat occurs
In the subsample of individuals who were not married for at least
one year in the 1969—1974 period, MARRYR2 is significant atthe 10 per
cent level; its coefficient equals 0.20.32
withinmarriage ((I) )fallingas the number of years married (n)
t,n,Tfl ) increases.MAR}4 has a positive but insignificant coefficient.
Additional evidence on wage growth during marriage comes from unre-
portedregressiDns.Ifwidowhoodis not asanticipated as marital disso—
lution, then m31es who become widowed will experience a greater rate of
wage growth during their married years than males who become s€parated or
divorced.Thisprediction receives weak confirmation.In the subsample
of individuals who become separated or divorced in the 1969—1974 period,
the coefficient of MARRYR2 approximately equalled 0.17. In the subsample
of males who became widowed during this period, an additional year of
marriage led to more than a 30 cent larger wage growth. However, in these
small samples, neither coefficient is significant.
The final regression in Table 8 utilizes the full sample. As before,
EFI and DSTATE are significantly positive. MARRYR2 is correctly positive
and is significant. Final marital status (MARR4) is negative and is again
insignificant. The coefficient of initial marital status (MARR8) is nega—
tive and is significant at the seven percent level; this finding lends
some support to the hypothesis that married males invest less per hour in
the accumulation of human capital than single males (i.e.,
m
<0).
Additional evidence on the determinants of wage growth comes from the
Project TALENT data. Table 9 presents regressions estimating the growth
in wage rates between 1965 and 1971. The average growth in wage rates
over these six years in this young and highly educated sample is close to
$3.Educationalattainment is the only variable that has a significant
impact onwagegrowth. Those with a B.A. areesrimatedto have approxi-
mately $1.00 greater wage growth than high school graduates. The first




WAGE GROWTH 1965 TO 1971
asignificant at .05 level
Never Married in 1965 Not marriedMarried
bMarried once in 1971; married in 1971
W511 W511 W51 1 w5iib




























































































1965. In this sample, those who marry by 1971 experielice a 16 cont greater
wage growth than those who do not marry. As predicted, wage growth is
positively related to MARRYR and is negatively related to NOMARR1. One
year of previouss'arriageexperience is estimated to increase wages by
seven cents. Current marital status (MARR) has a positive but insignificant
coefficient. The coefficients of regression (2) imply that 10 years of
previous marriage experience would be required to increase wages by 72 cents
(14 percent of the 1971 wage rate). In the fourth regression, the subsample
of never—married males in 1965 who were married once in 1971 and married in
1971 is used. With MARRYR more accurately measured, its coefficient jumps
by more than 50 percent; one year of marriage is now estimated to raise
wage growth by 11 cents. MARRYR is, however, still insignificant. In the
fifth regression those who are unmarried in 1965 and married in 1971 exper-
ience 18 cents greater wage growth than those who were unmarried in both
years. In the sixth regression, males who were married in 1965 and unmar-
ried in 1971 are estimated to have 71 cents smaller wage growth than those
who were married in both years.
Let us now compare individuals to themselves. A subsample has been
formed from the Income Dynamics data set to test the specification found
in equation (7). Males were included in this data set if in the 1968—19714
period they spent at least two adjacent years married and two adjacent
years unmarried. DIFF equals the average annual wage growth between adja—
cent married years less the average annual wage growth between adjacent
unmarried years.
If in this sample, married males are approximately the same age as
unmarried males (i.e., k0) and D., —D .. — D.+ D.0, then the
j'rk+l ji-Kj+1 3
meanvalue of DIFF provides an estimate of35






Standard Error of Mean of DIFF







Males are estimated to experience an 18 cent greater annual increase in
wage rates when married than when not married; that is, the mean of DIFF =
0.18.This difference is, however, not significant. The mean of DIFF is
significantly positive at the six percent level in the subsample of males
who become unmarried with age (i.e., k <0).It should be noted that
since in this subsample the married years precede the unmarried years, the
significant sign of DIFF may reflect nothing more than the concavity of
the age—wage profile.
The following regression further tests the specification of equation
DIFF =1.020*-.028k -.00000040DCITY +.068DJAN
(.446) (.040) (.00000061) (.047)
_.022* MACED .075
(.011) No. Obs. —96
The average change in city size in married years less the average change
in city size in unmarried years (DCITY), a similar variable for January
temperatures (DJAN), and k do not significantly affect wage growth. The
negative sign of k is predicted by equation (7), but the signs of DCITY
(7):36
and of DJAN are inconsistent with cross sectional results. As retirement
approaches, the benefits of the additional investment in human capital
associated with marriage fall, causing (XI)tm to fall. The significant
and negative sign of the average age in the married years (MACED) is con-
sistent with this expectation.
TABLE 11





ak DCITY, and DJAN evaluated
at zero. Source: regression
on p. 35.
The decline over the life cycle in the additional investment that occurs In
marriage can be seen in Table 11. The regression estimates that at age 20,
theannual growth in wage rates is 58 cents greater if an individual is
married than if that same individual is not married. By age 40, the dif-
ference has fallen to 14 cents. Neithe: of these differences, however, is
12
significant.
How much of the unexplained wage differential between married males
and never—married males is attributable to differences in labor supply?
In equations (10) and (11), labor suppy and experience arc the principal
explanators of variation across individuals in wage rates and in wage
growth. There is no information in the Income Dynamics data set about the
12That is, 1.020 —.022MACED is not significantly different from
zero for adult values of MACED. See Theil, PrniIes of Econometrics,
p. 133.37
number of hours worked prior to 1967. Moreover, since this initial stock
of human capital (W5) is unobservable, the coefficients of a regression
estimating equation (10) may be biased. Accordingly, equation (11) rather
than equation (10) has been estimated. The sample consists of the set of
males who reported a wage rate (<$9.98) for regular work on their main job








(.0471) No. Obs. =799
The variables HOURA and HTCEXP correspond to the first and second
terms in equation (10), respectively. Both are significant and take on
the predicted signs. Only two of the remaining variables are significant.
Change in union membership (DUNO4) has a significant and positive impact
on wage growth, while changing states (DSTATO) is associated with signif 1—
cantly smaller wage growth.
What does this regression imply about the wage differential between
continuously married males and never—married males of the same age?
Assume that there is no difference In labor supply between the two groups
In the first two years of experience and that group A (married or about—
to—be—married males) work 250 more hours annually than group B (never—
married males) over the rest of the life cycle. The wage differentials
13The regression of coefficients obtained fromthis sample will be
less biased than regression coefficients estimated from a sample in which
wage rates must be estimated.38
under these assumptions between groups A and B at several points in the
life cycle are shown in the second column of Table 12. A continuously
married male with group A characteristics and 20 years of experience is
estimated to have a wage rate which is 7.4 percent greater than a never
married male with group B characteristics and 20 years of experience.
Thus, over one—third of the unexplained wage differential hetween narried
and never—married males appears to be attributable to differences in labor
supply. The third column in Table 12 is calculated under the assumption
that the difference in annual labor supply between the two groups equals
100 hours rather than 250 hours. The estimated wage differentials urder
this assumption are correspondingly smaller.
TABLE 12
Experience Percent WaLe Differential between Groups A and B
GroupAworks 250 more Group A works 100 more
hcurs annually fron hours annually from )
3rdyear of experience 3rd year of experience







The evidence presented in this paper suggests that marriage—associated
investment in human capital is a small but important component of the wage
differential that is observed in many earnings regressions. Married males
are shown to work over 10 percent more hours than single males. However,
no significant increase in labor supply accompanies marriage, despite the
fact that males significantly decrease the time they spend working when
they become separated or divorced. The evidence on the extent of the
specialization in the labor market that accompanies marriage Is thus mixed.
Furthermore, reasonable estimates of this specialization are shown to
account for less than one—half of the unexplained wage differential between
married males and never—married males.
The direct evidence on the relation between marriage and wages Is weak.
Introducing variables measuring the number of years married into earnings
regressions causes marital status coefficients to fall by 20 to 50 percent.
Wages are significantly related to the number of years married in the
Project TALENT data but not in the Income Dynamics data. Furthermore, in
the Income Dynamics data, a significant relationship between wage growth
and the number of years married is found; a sizable wage differential
between married and unmarried males emerges after three and a half years
of marriage. Of course, the significant relationship between wage growth
and the number of years married may reflect a selectivity phenomenon. In
the Project TALENT data, the number of years married is unrelated to wage
growth. Finally, evidence from the Income Dynamics data suggests that the
annual growth in wage rates when an individual is married is greater than
the annual growth in wage rates for the same individual when he is not
married.40
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Income Dynamics Data Set
ACEH4: age in 1974
AGE2: (AGEH4)2
AGND4: state value of land and buildings per acre in agriculture
CHIL4: number of children under 18 years of age in family unit
CITY4: size of the largest city in the primary sampling unit (PSU) in
1974
DCITY: average annual change in city size between adjacentmarried
years less the average annual change in city sizebetween
adjacent unmarried years
DCITY84: CITY4 —sizeof the largest city in the PSU in 1968
DENS4: county population per square mile in 1974
DIFF: average annual change in wage rates between adjacentmarried
years less the average annual change in wage ratesbetween
adjacent unmarried years
DIST4: distance in 1974 to the nearest city of at least 50,000 people
DJAN: average annual change in state January temperaturesbetween
adjacent married years less the average annual change in state
January temperatures between adjacent unmarried years
DJAN84: JAN4 —stateaverage January temperature in 1968
DKID: CHIL4 -CHIL8
DSTATE: 1 if state in which respondent lives in 1974 is not the same
state in which respondent lives in 1968
ootherwise
DSTATO:1 if individual lived in a different state in 1974 than in 1970
ootherwise
DUN84: UN4 —unionmembership in 196842
Income_yamicsData Set(continued)
EN: number of grades of school completed
EW4: educationof thewifein 1974; if no wife, EW4O
EW84: EW4 —EW8




EXPCU4:number of years on current job in 1974
HOURH4:annual hours working for money in 1973 (asked in 1974)
JAN4: stateaverage January temperature in 1974
HOIJR84: HOURH4-HOURH8
HOURA: HOURHOHOURH1 +HOURH2 + HOURH3
HTCEXP:HOURHO x(EXP—4)+HOURH1x(EXP-3) +HOURH2x(EXP2)
+ HOURH3 x(EXP—1)
JULY4: state average July temperature in 1974
JULY42: (JULY4)2
K: average age when married less the average agewhen unmarried
LOSS: 1 if individual is unmarried sometime in the 1969—1974 period
O otherwise
LW4: natural logarithm of the ratio of total labor income in 1973
to HOURH4
LWMO4: natural logarithm of the wage rate for regular work on the
individual's main job in 1974 less the natural logarithm of
the wage rate for regular work on the individual'smainjob
in 1970
MACED: the average age during the married years
MARR4: 1 if individual currently married In 1974
O otherwise
MARR84:MARR4 —MARR843
MARRYR:estimated number of years married as of 1973 (ACEH8 —ageof
first marriage -SEP-1)+ MARR8 + MARR9 + MARRO + MARR1 +
MARR2+MARR3;the tcrm in parentheses is constrained to be
nonnegative
MARRYR2: number of years married in the 1968—1973 period
NMARR: 1 if married sometime in 1969—1974 period
ootherwise
PREC4: state annual inches of rainfall in 1974
RACE1: 1 if nonwhite in 1971
ootherwise
SEC: 1 if marriage in 1968 is not first marriage
O otherwise
SEP: number of years the respondent has been separated, widowed, or
divorced by 1968 if widowed, separated, or divorced at the time
of the survey in 1968
SICK: sum of the annual hours of illness in the 1967—1973 period
SICK84:number of hours sick in 1973 less the number of hours sick in
1967
STU4: 1 if student in 1974
O otherwise
STU84: STIJ4 —STU8
UN4: 1 if belongs to union in 1974
ootherwise
W84: estimated wage rate in 1973 (asked in 1974) less estimated wage
rate in 1967 (asked in 1968)





Eli: number of grades of school completed
JOBS: number of different employers on full—time jobs held between
June 1960 and September 30, 1971 less the number of full—time
paid jobs held between June 19E0 and September 30, 1965
LOSS: 1 if not married in 1971
O otherwise
MARR: 1 if married in 1971
O otherwise
MARRYR:28 —ageat first marriage; NARRYR>0
NNARR: 1 if ever married in 1971
ootherwise
NMARR1: 1 ifmarried in 1971
ootherwise
NOMARR1:numberof marriages in 1971 in excess of one :)
RACE: 1 if nonwhite
Ootherwise
RURAL: 1 if the pupils attending the respondent's secondaryschool came
from an area primarily small town (under 5000) or rural—farm
O otherwise
SICK1: fraction of the year spent sick at home or in the hospital
between 1960 and 1961 times 100
W5l1: wage in 1971 —wagein 1965
WYEAR11: natural logarithm of wage in 1971